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- ART. VII.—1. *The North American Review on Hungary.* An Article in the *Christian Examiner* for November, 1850. Boston: Crosby & Nichols.
2. *The War in Hungary, 1848–1849.* By MAX SCHLESINGER.* Translated by JOHN EDWARD TAYLOR. Edited, with Notes and an Introduction, by FRANCIS PULZSKY,† Ex-Secretary of State to Ferdinand V., King of Hungary. London: R. Bentley. 1850. 2 vols. 12mo.
3. *Hungary: its Constitution and its Catastrophe.* By CORVINUS. London: John Murray. 1850. 8vo.
4. *Austria.* By PETER E. TURNBULL, Esq., F.R.S., F.S.A. London: John Murray. 1840. 2 vols. 8vo.
5. *Verzeichniss der unter den Insurrectionellen Regierung Ungarns durch Martial-oder Statarialgerichte hingerichteten, oder ohne alle Justiz hingeschlachteten Individuen.* [A Catalogue of the Individuals who have been put to death by martial or summary law, or slain without any of the forms of justice, under the insurrectionary government of Hungary.] The number of cases is 467. Wien. 1850. 4to. pp. 21.
6. *Genesis der Revolution in Oesterreich im Jahre 1848.* Leipzig. 1850. 16mo.
7. *Thronfolge und die Pragmatische Sanction in Ungarn; nebst einer Skizzirten Geschichte der neunmonatlichen Ofen-Pester Parteiherrschaft under ihrer Umtriebe.* Pressburg. 1849. 8vo. pp. 216.
8. *Geschichte des Oestreichischen Kaiserstaates.* Von JOHANN GRAF MAILATH. Fünfter Band. Hamburg. 1850. 8vo. pp. 488.
9. *Die Letzten zwei Jahre Ungarns. Chronologisches Tagebuch der Magyarischen Revolution.* Verfasst von J. J. VON ADLERSTEIN. Wien. 1850.

* "The author is an Hungarian by birth, but long ago quitted his native country, residing first in Prague, and subsequently in Berlin. He is perfectly familiar with Hungary, and his conception of persons and characters is essentially accurate." *Preface*, by F. Pulszky.

† "Pulszky's name was one of the first on the list of those whom Prince Windischgrätz claimed to be given up by the city of Vienna. But he escaped in time from the court martial and from certain death. . . . After a short stay in Paris, he repaired to London as the accredited agent of his country. Kossuth could not have found a more active, able, and competent man in Hungary for this post." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*.

10. *Denkschrift über die October-Revolution in Wien. Ausführliche Darstellung aller Ereignisse seit dem 13 März, vor und seit der Katastrophe an den Taborbrücken, der Ermordung Latours, etc.* Verfasst und herausgegeben von WENCESLAW GEORG DUNDER. Wien. 1849. 8vo. pp. 903.
11. *Ueber Oesterreichs Staatsausgaben und Verwaltung, in Hauptumrissen dargestellt.* Von JOSEPH RITTER VON HAUER. Wien. 1850. 8vo. pp. 423.

"I do not pretend that the quarrel of a part of the Hungarian people (the Magyar race) against another part (the Slavic race,) and that struggle of Hungary, thus divided with itself, against Austria, *was the least in the world* a French or even a democratic cause. *I know perfectly well that it was nothing of the sort*; that this was a double or triple war of a character quite foreign to our discussions and our revolutions on this side of the western world. *It was a civil war amongst the Hungarians themselves, growing out of quarrels historical in their origin, and out of jealousies of race.* It was a federal war between the Hungarians and Austrians for more or less independent conditions of federation, or for the reconquering of national interests. It is true that France and democracy had not an atom of their proper cause involved in this confusion of conflicts." Lamartine's *Past, Present, and Future*. (Am. ed.) p. 60.

"The peasants are contradistinguished from the people; the word *populus* being in Hungary, as in ancient Rome, confined to the patrician body, — the nobles, clergy, and citizens of free towns. The rest of the community are termed *plebs*, and frequently *plebs misera contribuens* — a singularly significant expression, designating at once the state of the people, and the privilege or exemption which the nobles chiefly prize. One is here reminded of the French description of the Roturiers, "*gens tail-lables et corvéables.*" Originally they were astricted to the soil; but in 1405, a law was made suffering them to quit with the lord's leave, which, however, was not to be arbitrarily or capriciously withheld. . . . In the Diet of 1764, Maria Theresa in vain attempted to obtain a more favorable law from the nobles; and therefore she issued her famous *Urbarium*, which is partly declaratory, like the *Bulla aurea*, in favor of the inferior nobles; but partly also enactive. The peasant had by this important instrument the free power of leaving his land, provided his debts are paid and there is no criminal charge against him; but his lord cannot remove him. A portion of land was allotted to him

of from sixteen to forty acres of arable, and from six to twelve of pasture, with a house and one acre of garden ground. . . . The power of inflicting corporal punishment was likewise reduced to the bestowing of twenty-five lashes. . . . One of the greatest grievances which this wise and liberal measure left was the Lord's Court, having jurisdiction of disputes, not only between peasant and peasant, but also between the lord and peasant; the judge being named by the former. The power of inflicting capital punishment is now only possessed by some few lords, or by special grant. Prince Esterhazy is one of those few. The new *Urbarium* of 1835, which does the greatest honor to the eminent statesman so long at the head of the Austrian councils, removed this cause of complaint. Prince Metternich provided by this edict that the jurisdiction of the lord's or manor court should be confined to causes between peasant and peasant, and that all questions arising between lord and peasant should be henceforth tried by a new court composed of the district magistrate and four disinterested persons. He abolished all right of inflicting corporal punishment, restricting the lord's court to an imprisonment not exceeding three days, in case the peasant failed to perform his services. . . .

"Such is the Hungarian Constitution—'the ancient idol of the nation,' as one of their own authors has said; and an idol to whose worship they have sacrificed their country, and made themselves three hundred years behind the rest of Europe in every branch of social improvement. This constitution means, in the mouths of its votaries, the privileges of the nobles, the oppression of the people, the neglect of national prosperity, the sacrifice of real and solid advantages to a nominal glory and empty pride. It is by another of these authors charged as the cause why he deeply grieves to see his countrymen wretched, degenerated, and grovelling in the dust. Lord Brougham's *Political Philosophy*. London. 1846. Vol. ii. pp. 94–97.

"The ancient collection of laws, the *Tripartitum*, declares that the nation, or body politic, is composed exclusively of nobles; accordingly, out of 550,000 nobles, the Magyars count 464,000, which leaves only 86,000, with a proportionately feeble influence, to the Slaves, the Germans, and the Wallachians. It is this corps of about half a million of Magyars, which keeps in check the Austrian government, the Slaves, the Croats, and the Germans, which has gained great legislative advantages over them during the last few years, and has at last openly declared war upon them. The nobles alone have votes in the fifty-five*

* M. Rey seems to include the three counties of Transylvania in this number.

counties, and they assemble every third year at a *restauration* to elect their magistrates and the deputies to the Diet. The first Gespann, or honorary Chief Magistrate, is nominated by the Crown; but the first and the second Vice-Gespann, the judges of the several districts and their sworn assessors, the notaries, the fiscal, and his assistants, the collectors of taxes, in a word every thing which concerns the administration, the tribunals, and the police, is entirely in the nomination of the nobles. The counties thus form distinct and almost independent governments, varying greatly in population and extent, for some of them count half a million of inhabitants." M. Rey: *Autriche, Hongrie, et Turquie en 1839* — 48, p. 123, as cited by Corvinus.

"The rights of the nobles were as vast as a privileged race of conquerors could possibly enjoy, for they had all the advantages which the Spartans had over the Helots, with the exception of the obligation of the latter to provide food and clothing for their masters. The noble was inviolable in his person, his goods were not subject to sequestration at the suit of a creditor, nor could he be imprisoned upon any charge; the villein alone could be legally flogged, not so the noble; neither the noble himself nor his servants paid any tax, real or personal, to the king or the counties; and neither his horses nor his men could be required to work at the roads or the dikes. The peasant alone was the person who paid the tax termed 'domestical,' for the expenses of the Diet and the county administration. The peasant paid the salaries of the schoolmaster, the notary, the priest, the patrol. The peasant constructed and maintained, either with his money or his labor, the roads, bridges, churches, schools, public buildings, dikes, canals; and it was the peasant and the townsman who drained the marshes, turned the course of rivers, &c. The peasants and the townspeople paid the war-tax and furnished recruits." *Ib.* p. 126.

"The internal government of the nation is a mixed monarchy and aristocracy. Laws can only be enacted by the joint consent of the King and the Diet; and although the executive power be said to lie with the King, yet the sovereign has only the nomination of lords-lieutenants (*obergespanne*) of counties and administrators; since every other public officer is either elected by the county itself, or named by its lord-lieutenant, — a nomination, however, which is often successfully disputed. . . . Under the kings of the reigning house, a great portion of Hungary and of the annexed districts was conquered from the Turks by great exertion on the part of the other imperial states; and many important alterations, in the relations of the King and the estates, took place at different times. What are called the cardinal privileges

of the nobility and the clergy, who are looked upon as equal to the nobility, have been preserved to the present day to an extent unparalleled in any country in Europe. . . . The nobles being mostly Magyars, it follows that the Magyar nation has been chiefly instrumental in maintaining the constitution during so many centuries." McCulloch's *Com. Gaz.* (New York ed.) 1845. pp. 1142—1144.

"The county constituency consisted originally of the aggregate body of resident nobles, or—as we should term them—gentry, combined with the beneficed clergy, who sat by virtue of their office. The gentry, on the other hand, were chiefly of Magyar extraction, the descendants of the Arpadian warriors who constituted the original landholders; their ranks, however, had from time to time been recruited, as the Crown had the power of granting letters of nobility to individuals of the conquered races." *Corvinus*, p. 14.

"As for the fear so often expressed in Hungary, that the government by letting in so many foreign speculators will destroy the Magyar nationality, and convert the country into a German province, or a new Judea, it is too ridiculous to require an answer. A very little knowledge of human nature is sufficient to teach us that the second, if not the first, generation of those whose origin is not considered too reputable, are certain to forget all about it. The Hungarians may rest assured that it will not be the fault of the newly-made nobleman,—be he of what origin or religion he may,—if he does not very soon persuade himself that his ancestors were of the purest Magyar blood, and if he himself does not become the warmest supporter of Magyarism in all its forms." Paget's *Hungary*, vol. i. pp. 99, 100.

"The cardinal privileges of the nobility were,—1. Freedom from personal arrest until after conviction of a crime. 2. Subjection to no judge but their legally crowned king. 3. Perfect immunity from every species of taxation. It was the last of these privileges which rendered the pauper nobles so mischievous an element of the constituency. No abandonment of their privileges could be expected from men whose very existence depended on their maintenance of them. On the other hand, though the Crown had the power of enlarging the constituency by granting letters of nobility to the peasants, there was a paramount obstacle in the way of any systematic use of this power. The Crown lost a tax-payer whenever it enfranchised a villein. There was no practical means therefore of recruiting the constituency on any large scale, yet this host of paupers formed the majority in the congregations of the counties, which returned the deputies to the Lower House, elected the county magistrates,

and assessed both the general and local taxes upon the peasants. It was the representatives of such a constituency who denied votes to the deputies of the free towns and to the delegates of the chapters, and who contested the right of the Magnates to initiate laws. Let us imagine for a moment the English constitution to have been stereotyped in the mould of Magna Charta with its villeins *regardant*, and villeins *in gross*, and we shall have a state of things not half so intolerable as the constitution of Hungary exhibited till within the last very few years, and for this single reason, that the relation of the Hungarian peasants to the nobles was not a personal, but a corporate relation." *Corvinus*, pp. 38–39.

"The count supreme is generally a great lord who possesses estates in the county, and whose ambition or patriotism induces him to take a part in public affairs. The law constitutes him the representative of the sovereign, but it abandons the civil, political, and judicial administration to the viscount, whom the congregation elects, and who, in fact, wields all the power. The count supreme contents himself with appearing on the days of great assemblies, and at receptions and elections. He frequently travels in foreign countries, and whole months pass without those who are under his administration having a glimpse of him. By reason of these circumstances, the administration in Hungary has escaped from the hands of the Austrian government, and fallen into those of the country itself—as the county assemblies really administer all affairs." *Degerando: De l'Esprit Public en Hongrie*, p. 253, as cited by *Corvinus*.

"The entire surface of the soil is possessed by the nobles, for no one not noble may hold land in Hungary. These nobles, assembled in county meeting, nominate to all offices in the county, judicial, fiscal, and administrative, without any interference of the crown. . . . In this lower house [of the Diet] the deputies of the nobles alone may *vote*; those of the cities being only permitted to attend and to speak. The class of peasants, who form the vast bulk of the community, have no political rights, and are held under rigorously feudal subjection." Turnbull's *Austria*, ii. p. 396.

"A feudal and privileged aristocracy is little likely to cherish the western doctrines of liberalism and democracy; and that of Hungary is too sagacious to think of seeking for themselves a distinct independence. . . . They are aware of the hostile feeling with which they are viewed by the towns, and of the ill-concealed hatred borne to them by a semi-barbarous peasantry. Whatsoever be the attitude they assume towards the Crown, they are certain that its interests and policy will secure them from the

wild havoc of popular insurrection ; but were the connection with Austria dissolved,—were Hungary in her present state left to the unaided care of her nobles, short would be the period ere both their castles and their persons would be swept away by the horrors of a ferocious servile revolution.” *Id.* pp. 490, 491.

“In Hungary, it [the system of education] is opposed, avowedly on principle, by a most influential section of the liberal party in the Diet, who fear that popular education would be a source of danger to property, if unaccompanied with a greater extension of civil rights, which, however they themselves have hitherto felt it inexpedient to accord.” Turnbull, ii. p. 141.

“It was vain to attempt to better the condition of the people, while one law existed for them and another for the nobles—while the peasants bore all the taxation of the state, and were bound to work indefinitely for their superiors. . . . It was in vain that this oppressed people stretched their hands towards the Crown for protection. Its power was too feeble to compete with the autocracy of feudal domination. Several times, especially in 1772, the sovereign strenuously urged on the Bohemian and Hungarian lords the expediency of limiting and defining the *robot*s, services, and dues, so as to leave to the peasant some portion of time for the cultivation of his own plot of land. But these endeavors were fruitless, until at length the terror occasioned by the present insurrections afforded to the Crown the opportunity of acting vigorously on its own sense of right.”

Id. pp. 19, 20.

“In the Diet of 1764, the third and last held under Maria Theresa, the grievances of the peasants were most strongly urged on the attention of the nobles, but no ameliorations were obtained ; occupied with their own affairs, those of the weaker classes were delayed to some future period. The next year, the natural consequences of the agitation of such a question without any step being made towards its solution, were manifested in a rising of the discontented peasantry in several parts of the country, and in the commission of the usual outrages before the forces of the government could allay the ferment. Taking advantage of the alarm which these excesses had impressed upon the public mind, the great Queen determined, by an act of arbitrary power, herself to apply the remedy to so crying an evil ; an act which, if it cannot be defended as strictly constitutional, will never want apologists among the friends of humanity.

“The result of this determination was the celebrated *Urbarium* of Maria Theresa, the *Magna Charta* of the Hungarian peasantry. Partly a formal recognition of established customs, partly a grant

of new rights, the importance of which was not at first perceived, this Urbarium, *though unsanctioned by the Diet, became* virtually, and almost without opposition, *the law of the land*. After the death of Joseph, when the Diet was again called together, it was adopted provisionally till a more perfect one could be framed, and *so it continued till 1835.*" Paget's *Hungary*, vol. i. pp. 295, 296.

"No further change in the law of landlord and tenant took place until the Diet of 1832-6, when a new Urbarium *was proposed by the Crown*, and accepted by the Diet, the object of which was to confer on the peasant a kind of 'tenant right,' and to attach the liability of taxation to the property, and not to the person of the cultivator." *Corvinus*, p. 41.

"One of the most extraordinary powers which the constitution allowed to the Comitatus was that of disputing the interpretation which the Crown gave to any law, and of suspending within the limits of the county the execution of it. . . . Even when a law was clear, it was by no means an unusual practice to neglect it. A striking illustration of this fact occurs in reference to the article *de nobilibus in fundo contribubionali degentibus*, of the decree of 1836, which obliged the nobles who were in the possession of lands originally occupied by peasants, and so subject to taxation, to pay certain taxes in respect of such lands. This law continued for ten years to be a dead letter in many of the counties, because the county magistracies were reluctant to dissolve their constituencies by enforcing it, and so endanger their own reëlection." *Id.* pp. 24, 25.

"The Magyar movement is widely distinguished, both by the power which called it forth and the object it had in view, from all the revolutions that convulsed Europe during the last two years. The political knowledge of the Magyars does not extend much beyond that of their own constitution; and it is remarkable with what singular affection and constancy this ancient constitution, with all its defects and abnormities, has been held fast and cherished by the people. Whilst all the other nations have sought to enlarge more or less their representative constitutions, the Magyar has dreaded any change in his, clinging to its very letter, as the Mussulman to the words of the Koran." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. i. p. 114.

"The Sclavacks [Slowacks] are a branch of that great Sclavish family, which seems, at one period, to have occupied nearly the whole east of Europe, from the Baltic and Adriatic to the banks of the Wolga. There can be little doubt that the greater part of Hungary was peopled by them, till the fierce Magyars drove them from the fertile plains to the barren moun-

tains, which they still hold. The chief part of that mountainous district between the Danube, the Theiss, and the most northern range of the Carpathians is peopled by Slavacks, who still retain their original language, (a dialect of the Slavish, though differing both from the Bohemian and Polish,) their national customs and characteristic appearance. Other portions of the same race occupy, in the south of Hungary, the countries now called Croatia and Sclavonia, and extend south, nearly to the ruins of Athens itself. In Hungary, they seem to have experienced the same fate as the British in our own country, where the bleak mountains of Wales, the Highlands of Scotland, and the west coast of Ireland have preserved the pure blood of Britain's earliest lords; while Saxon churls, and Norman soldiers appropriated her fairest fields to their own use." Paget's *Hungary*, vol. i. pp. 82, 83.

"The Slovacks were formerly good Magyars,—indeed, the majority are so at the present day, although recently they have been commended for their Slavish Austrian bias. They however form but a small, harmless, unpretending race, which was first kneaded into shape by the head-cooks from Vienna, and by the lowest scullions from Prague." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. i. p. 89.

"Since the Hungarian Diet has proposed to enforce the use of the Magyar language instead of the Latin, in public transactions throughout all Hungary, a spirit of opposition has been excited among the Slavish population, which threatens very serious consequences. The first effect of the measure proposed by the Diet was, the rousing up in Croatia of a strong sentiment of nationality, which found vent in the establishment of a periodical, something like the 'Penny Magazine' in form, in the Slavish language. This is the 'Danica Ilirska,' edited by Dr. Gay. It is published once a week, is very respectably got up, and contains national songs, original articles, and translations.

"It is no uncommon thing to hear them reckoning up the Croats, Sclavonians, Bosnians, Dalmatians, Servians, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians, and then comparing this mass of Slaves with the three or four millions of Magyars, and proudly asking why they should submit to deny their language and their origin because the Magyars command it.

"I am very far from wishing this party success, though I cannot help in some degree sympathizing with a people who resist, when they think a stronger power is willing to abuse its strength by depriving the weaker of those objects—language and religion—which they hold as most dear.

"The act has passed, however, which declares that, in ten years' time, no Croat shall be eligible to a public office who can-

not read and write the Magyar language, and the consequence has been, the creation of a feeling of hatred against the Magyars, which bodes but very ill for the speedy Magyarizing of the Croatian people. Paget's *Hungary*, vol. ii. pp. 582 – 589.

“It is a bold assumption that the cause of the revolution was the cause of Hungary ; it is very questionable whether, even in respect to the Magyar race, those persons who blazoned its name were in any sense its true representatives. This race is described by a recent Swiss traveller, in language which may be paraphrased, as ‘loyal and generous, hospitable to an excess ; but, by the side of these and other manly qualities, exhibiting a dangerous leaning towards an enthusiasm without reflection, and a vivacity without calculation. The Magyar soon becomes warm, and he then gives way to the illusions of his fancy, and, with an ardor peculiar to himself, plunges in pursuit of the strangest chimeras.’ The Magyar spirit still bears the stamp of its early origin ; it is Oriental and Tatár. The civilization of Western Europe has made no impression upon it beyond its surface, and its effects present many features in common with those which have resulted in the Ottoman empire from the infiltration of European ideas since the reign of Selim III., and which do not extend beyond forms and words. One of the most patriotic Magyars, Count Stephen Széchenyi, in his last pamphlet against M. Kossuth, entitled ‘The People of the East,’ mentions that Hungary has never felt the influence of that civilizing element of the middle ages, the expression of which is found in the institutions of chivalry. The Magyars, it is true, have certain feelings peculiar to themselves and consonant to their institutions, but the Magyar is essentially a despot. It is especially in this particular that the revolutionary element of Western Europe is directly opposed to the national spirit of the Magyar race.” Corvinus's *Hungary*, pp. 10, 11.

“Some worthy patriots, who had grown old in the opposition party in the former Diets, and who were more familiar with the history of the revolts against Austria, than with the ideas of the present age, were alarmed at the thought of quitting what they called *the historical ground*, in order to take up foreign or untried theories. In their opinion, it was less important to obtain liberal reforms than to embarrass or destroy the government. Like some devout persons, who have more fear of the devil than love of God, there was in their patriotism more hatred of Austria than love of liberty. . . . Why not go back three centuries behind the age, to the time when the nation itself elected its own kings ? . . . These were the sentiments and almost the language of a great part of that lesser nobility who form the whole

political nation, own the land, constitute the county assemblies, appoint the judges of the tribunals, compose by their deputies the lower house of the Diet, and keep it constantly under their control, through their imperative commands. . . .

"It was the glory of a small number of men, (who seemed to have more to lose than the lesser nobility by this substitution of liberty for privileges,) to save Hungary from a dangerous anachronism, and to teach it that it was now by reforms, not by conspiracies, that they were to save the State. Between the two roads then open to Hungary, they took, not that which their private interest or their historical grudge pointed out to them, but that on which they could obtain the aggrandizement of their country, and a more equal division of well-being and liberty among their fellow-citizens. *A great number of magnates, and especially of young magnates, embraced with ardor the new ideas of progress and social reforms*; they consecrated to this cause all the warmth of their convictions, and the influence of their rank and their fortunes. . . . These men dared to adopt a new policy; they profited by their power over the country to carry it along with them in a movement of ideas directly opposed to the old routine. The prejudices of the nation, instead of helping them, were opposed to their undertaking, which could not be accomplished without the aid of the Austrian government. . . . The Austrian government adopted all of what was immediately practicable in the projects of the young reformer (Széchény.) In the Diet of 1832 - 36, it took the initiative in all the measures that were demanded by the new party. In reading the *royal propositions*, it seems as if we were perusing extracts from those writings [of Széchény] of which we have translated certain passages." De Langsdorff: *Revue des Deux Mondes*, December, 1848.

"The liberal party in Hungary was divided into three factions. Our great reformer, the Count Széchényi, was worn out by his long and seemingly resultless struggles against the policy of the court of Vienna. He made a surrender of the leading ideas of his political life. He had, ever since 1829, been the champion of equal taxation and of legal equality. He had advocated the abolition of feudal burdens on the land. But he lived to consider these objects of his former aspirations as matters of secondary import. He became a practical man, and directed his energies to the steam navigation of the Danube, to the damming and diking of the river Theiss, to railroads, &c., and for the furtherance of these plans, the Count Széchényi, though still faithful to his principles, had drawn close to the conservative party, and became reconciled to the government of Vienna. . . . Count

Széchényi's practical clique was flanked by a more numerous and influential party. M. Kossuth's parliamentary opposition, *taking a firm stand on the letter of the law*, waged an unceasing warfare against the machinations of the Vienna bureaucracy. *His party advocated the institutions of the counties*, the free elections of civic magistrates, and the independence of boroughs; and they stood ready to repel any direct or indirect blow which might be aimed at these institutions. This party was supreme, both in strength and numbers. *The middle classes and the gentry belonged to it; while Széchényi's followers were members of the high aristocracy, who resided in the metropolis, and who scarcely ever busied themselves in the county elections.* . . . Baron Eötvös was the leader of the third party. He was imbued with the levelling tendencies of French liberalism. The men of Eötvös's school admired the theoretical perfection of centralization, and vied with the Vienna party in their aversion to the county institutions, with their assemblies and elections. His party considered Hungary as a '*tabula rasa*,' and they endeavored, in defiance of history, to raise a new political fabric; not on the ground of written law, but on the treacherous soil of the law of nature. It was chiefly composed of young men of letters, who, full of spirit and ability, were but too prone to discover the weak and faulty parts of the county government, while they were unable to appreciate practical soundness and its salutary influence. This circumstance caused them to withdraw from the elections, and to look down upon the struggles and contests of a parliamentary life. Their doctrines could not, therefore, have any influence. . . . Their leaders, though spirited and witty, *failed in bringing their ideas of centralization home to the minds of their readers. The national instincts of the Hungarian people were opposed to such notions.*" F. Pulszky's *Preface to The Village Notary*, by Baron Eötvös.

"Thousands with him [Bathiany] held fast in the struggle against Austria to the old constitution, and eventually sacrificed their lives in its defence; and the deposition of the House of Hapsburg was a subsequent measure of violence, which had nothing to do with the original tendency of the movement." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. i. p. 116.

"The Old Conservatives represented the imbodyed principle of fixedness at the period of the Pressburg Diets. Their motto might have been inscribed beside the national colors, — '*Noli me tangere*,' — in other words, 'Touch not our privileges — leave us to oppress and harass our peasantry, as our fathers and forefathers have done before us, by virtue of the laws of the country; leave us to oppress the German, the Sclavonian, and Wallach, by

virtue of the laws of the country ; leave us exempt from taxes, from road-tolls and bridge-tolls, by virtue of the laws ; but touch not the abuses in the counties, the military state, the taxation of the un-noble class ; on no account improve our roads, or admit a system of turnpikes into our free country ; above all, O King, touch not our Constitution, which is the best on the face of the globe from Japan to America ! ' ' *Id.* pp. 123, 124.

"The National Assembly consisted of three parties ;—1. a section of the aristocracy, (Magnates,) liberal on the whole, but firmly attached to the Austrian connection ;—2. a middle party, *including the new ministry*, whose watchword was the entire independence of a free Hungary, if possible under an Austrian king, if not, under some other sovereign, or form of sovereignty ;—3. an extreme radical, revolutionary party, represented by some thirty members," [the whole number of members being about five hundred.] Arthur Frey's *Recent History of Hungary*, as cited in the *London Athenæum*.

"The Hungarian revolution comprehended all the elements of success, — great statesmen, great generals, a great nation, and a country favorable to their arms. In the first French revolution the people had taken up arms *against* the king ; here (at the commencement at least) a nation had risen in support of their king."

"The democrats in Europe, in seeking to abolish the hereditary privileges of the nobles, abandoned with inconsiderate precipitancy the principles of the inalienable rights of man, for which they had fought and shed their blood. In a similar spirit of over-estimated self-reliance, the Austrian government now tramples on the most powerful aristocracy of the monarchy. In Batthyanyi's execution, they shook the confidence of the Magyar nation more than Kossuth had done by dethroning the House of Hapsburg. Men like Batthyanyi stand next to the monarch ; the people cannot imagine the throne divested of such an aristocratic support." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. ii. pp. 223, 241.

"Hungary had seized the opportunity afforded by the crisis, to plunge into the arena, and to demand the recognition of the independence of the kingdom. The concession was at once accorded, and it was proclaimed a distinct state, with its own king and diet, with an independent administration, and with political institutions modelled according to the demands preferred ; but, as if instigated by terror or bewildered by the pressure of events, the Austrian government conceded to that of Hungary the power to exercise over others the very prerogative against which they had themselves rebelled, namely, to bring the Slavonian provinces on their

borders into the same relations with the Diet at Pesth which they had themselves so strenuously repudiated at the court of Vienna. Dissensions and jealousies had existed for many years between the various races inhabiting Hungary ; but the Magyars, though the dominant and, physically considered, the superior race, were so numerically weak as to furnish barely a fourth part of the total returns of the census, the remainder, excepting an inconsiderable element of Germans, and about a million Wallachians, being made up entirely of Sclavonians. Formerly, the use of the Latin tongue stood in the same stead to this motley population as it did in the old times to the *litterati* of Europe, and enabled them to meet for common purposes on a neutral ground. But this compromise was terminated, some time back, by the substitution, on the part of the overweening Magyars, of their own national language for the conventional Latin ; and this example and foretaste of their oppressive ambition was naturally ill-received. At the late crisis, however, the Diet availed themselves of a situation in which the court of Vienna seemed scarcely to retain the power of refusing any thing, and obtained the imperial sanction for definitively and absolutely incorporating with the kingdom of Hungary those provinces of Croatia and Sclavonia, on their southern border, which had hitherto retained a *quasi* independence of their own, — the whole constituted kingdom being, of course, intended to represent only the dominant nationality of the Magyars.

But in this project they met with an opposition quite unexpected, at least in such force. The nationality of the Sclavonians had been quickened by the revolutionary epidemic into a passion quite as lively as that of the Magyars ; and they very reasonably considered, that, if the new system of politics emancipated the Hungarians from the control of the Germans, it could hardly be so anomalous in its operations as to subject them to the control of the Hungarians. Accordingly, the provincial Diet of Croatia returned a flat refusal to the proposals despatched from Pesth ; and when, upon the strength of the imperial sanction, the Hungarians prepared to enforce their will by arms, Baron Jellachich, the Ban of Croatia, promptly accepted the appeal, and taking the initiative, at once marched upon Hungary." Thompson's *Austria*. (London, 1849.) pp. 391 – 393.

"It is a striking fact, that in all the Crown-lands belonging to Hungary, — Sclavonia, Croatia, and the Military Frontier, as well as Slovakia, — the Jews, without exception, incline to Magyarism, readily renounce all German character, and have a thorough aversion to Slavism.

"The Magyars had a choice of enemies, — Wallachs, Slovacks, Serbs, and Croats ; and if they had hitherto proudly con-

sidered themselves the sole lords of the four thousand (German) square miles of that immense garden, in which the horses grow wild like the tobacco-plant, and the Slavish races figure as the cactus-hedge, these latter turned their thorns quite as often inside as outside." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. ii. pp. 4, 5.

"The pretence of the Hungarians, that they took up arms to secure the adoption of liberal principles in the empire, was a political fraud, which exposed itself by the tone of independence they arrogated when they perceived the authority of Austria was on the wane, and were emboldened in consequence to put forward the immoderate pretensions and demands which originated the war, and called forth the Ban, a Croat, who dreading the servitude intended to be imposed on his countrymen, unsheathed his sword to save their liberties and the undivided power of the empire. Should the Hungarians under Kossuth succeed, (a result little to be apprehended,) the Slavonians would be subjugated and deprived of all their privileges, and Austria would fall into the hands of wild theorists, instead of being regenerated." Thompson's *Austria*, p. 396.

"The other races, however, that were concerned in these changes, (effected in March and April, 1848,) and especially the Slavonians, immediately saw that the tendency of the Magyars was to merge all the other nationalities in their own, and to suppress them altogether, to which end the separation of the Hungarian government from the central government of the empire was a necessary means. This conviction, supported by recent experience, soon brought out the most determined opposition. The Croatian and Slavonian members of the Diet, in the proceedings of the two Houses, (or Tables,) had not raised their voices against these innovations, because the terrorism exercised by the Magyar party had deprived them of all freedom of speech, and because they also hoped that the Crown would reject the propositions of the Diet, which would inevitably have caused the empire to be divided into two hostile portions." . . . "The Croats and Slavonians were too well acquainted, through many years' experience, with the tendency of the Magyars, to hope for any effect whatever from the royal assurance, if it were not supported by material means. They strove, therefore, with unwearied zeal, to bring together these means, under the direction of their Ban." . . . "They were determined to repel injustice by force, without exacting from the Crown any active participation in the national movement, but only in the hope that this movement would not be treated as a rebellion against the king, whose faithful subjects they were willing still to remain; but without allowing their na-

tion to be Magyarized." . . . "They found hope only in their own power; and in the latter half of the month of May, they placed themselves in readiness to follow the call of their Ban, whenever he should summon them to defend with arms their rights and their freedom against the assaults of the Magyars. . . .

"On the other hand, the Magyars thought they detected in the position which the Croats began to take, an understanding between them and the court at Vienna; though their own fanatical zeal for their language and their nationality might well have taught them that another nation, as patriotic and as active as theirs, would not rest with folded arms when they saw the violent oppression of their freedom and their language attempted by a neighboring nation."

. . . "The holders of royal power at Pesth soon succeeded in calling forth a storm of royal displeasure against the Ban, who was suspected and hated by them, after an attempt made by them to remove him from the scene of his official duty and to summon him to the Magyar metropolis, and another attempt, to paralyze his power by sending Field-Marshal Hrabowsky as commanding general into Slavonia, had both failed. Jellachich was commanded in a very earnest, and even severe, manner, by the king, to render an account of his conduct as Ban, and for that purpose to appear without delay at the foot of the throne at Innspruck; whither he went, about the middle of June, attended by a numerous deputation." *Genesis der Revolution*, pp. 345-350.

. . . "The unsuccessful attempts to break the power of the Ban, the continuance of the measures of defence of the Croats and Slavonians, to whom the Servians were now united, notwithstanding the armed attack already made by Hrabowsky against them at Carlowitz on the 8th of June, on account of the Serbian national congress assembled there for the choice of a Patriarch and Wayvode, increased the fury and distrust of the Magyars against all who did not belong to their race, and do homage to it, but especially against the Court, because it was not inclined to leave free play to their tendency towards complete independence and absolute dominion over the other nations belonging to the kingdom of Hungary." *Ib.* p. 353.

"The Hungarian ministry must prepare for a struggle, if it would obtain its object, of breaking off Hungary from the monarchy; for Croatia and Slavonia would not obey the commands of the ministry. In the beginning of the movement, the Croats also had claimed a ministry of their own, and put forth sundry other demands, which were any thing but favorable to the unity of the monarchy. But all this went into the background as soon as they saw that their nationality was menaced by the Hungarian minis-

try. The tyranny of race and language, which had been exercised for many years by the Magyars was now severely expiated by the resistance of the Croats. At the last meeting of the Diet, Kossuth had exclaimed in open session : — ‘ But where lies Croatia ? I cannot find it on the map.’ He now found out to his cost where it lay. . . . The Magyar ministry tried in vain various means to bring the Ban into subjection. He was summoned to Buda-Pesth ; he did not come. A royal commissioner, General Hrabowsky, was ordered into Croatia ; but he was not disposed to enter the province. The Ban was called to Innspruck to answer for his conduct ; he obeyed, and soon convinced the emperor that he wished only the welfare of the monarchy and the dynasty. On his journey home, he learned from a newspaper that he was deposed ; but Croatia continued to obey him, and soon a royal ordinance appeared which reinstated him in his dignity and office. This deposition of the Ban was one of the most enigmatical occurrences of the time. Of the numerous reports which were circulated in reference to it, the most probable one is, that the President of the Magyar ministry, who was for some time in Innspruck, by some unknown means, obtained the emperor’s signature to a blank sheet of paper, and then, without the emperor’s knowledge, filled it out with the deposition of the Ban.* This report was somewhat confirmed by the fact, that not the slightest protest was made by the Hungarian ministry when the Ban continued in the execution of his office ; the Magyar ministry

* This is the document from which a long citation is made in the *Christian Examiner* of May last, (pp. 495, 496,) in order to prove that “ Ferdinand himself exposes the futility of the accusations which had been brought against the Hungarians as oppressors of the other races.” But to make it answer this purpose, it was necessary to falsify the date of the document, so as to avoid the gross inconsistency of making the emperor denounce Jellachich as a traitor, and warn his followers against an uncaused and wanton rebellion, at the very time when, according to the Magyars, Jellachich and the Croats were acting in secret concert with the emperor. The *Christian Examiner*, therefore, gives the date of the instrument as May 10, its true date being just one month later. The whole document may be found, translated, in the appendix to Schlesinger’s History. It cannot have been misdated in the *Examiner* by mere inadvertence, if the writer had read the whole instrument, and was not grossly ignorant of the facts of history ; for towards the close of it, allusion is made to the fact that the emperor had summoned Jellachich to come before him and defend his conduct, which summons, it is foolishly alleged, he had refused to obey. “ But Jellachich has as little obeyed this our present command as our former regulations, and has neither retracted the Congregation (called for the 5th of June,) nor has he appeared before ourselves at the appointed time.” Now, it is notorious that he did appear before the emperor at Innspruck in June, as summoned, and there had an interview with the chiefs of the Magyar ministry, Bathiany, Széchény, Esterhazy, and others, which interview terminated with the celebrated mutual defiance : — “ We shall meet again on the Drave ! ” said Bathiany. “ No ! ” answered Jellachich, “ but on the Danube.” And he kept his word. This gross misstatement of fact in the instrument itself is alone enough to prove Count Mailath’s statement, that the whole document was a forgery, or was obtained by surreptitious means.

dreaded any thorough investigation of this matter." Count Mailath's *Geschichte*, pp. 421, 422.

From a Memorial presented to the Archduke by the Hungarian Ministry, July 4th, 1848.

"If His Highness the Archduke John will bestow a careful attention upon all that we have just said, he cannot but be convinced of the true character of the rebellion of those States, which make great pretensions of fidelity to the Sovereign whilst violating the royal authority; — he cannot but perceive, that even their offer of joining Austria is merely a feigned pretext, in order to give at the crisis of the struggle such a superiority to the Slavish element in Austria, that after thus completely paralyzing the German element, and undermining the Austrian throne, the Empire shall be split up into independent Slavish kingdoms, and the very existence of the Austrian Imperial House shall be thus buried. And yet loyalty and attachment to the King is so deeply rooted in the heart of the Hungarian Nation, that the Illyrian rebels are well aware that, in openly exhibiting their intentions, they will not meet with any sympathy. They have therefore come forward in the spirit of reaction, as the pseudo-heroes of the royal authority, and against the Hungarian Nation, who have not attacked the royal power, for whom a legal independence and a constitutional administration is not a recent grant, but an ancient right sanctioned by innumerable royal oaths, — against the Hungarian Nation, which at this present moment, when almost every throne in civilized Europe is tottering, remains not only the firmest, but the only firm prop of the Austrian throne. This feeling and this experience have led us to request the kind assistance of His Highness the Archduke John with respect to the Illyrian rebellion.

"The disloyal rebels actually boast of the support of the offended ruling House itself! And when we requested His Majesty, in order to enlighten the unhappy and deceived people, by his own handwriting to let the people know that His Majesty disapproves of the rebellion, and is determined to maintain in all their integrity the solemnly affirmed inviolability of the Hungarian Crown and the authority of the laws, the leaders of the rebels deceived the people by declaring that this has not been done voluntarily on the part of His Majesty, but that it is merely an unwilling expression extorted by the Hungarian Ministry through means of compulsion." (*Signed by Bathiany, Kossuth, Szemere, Eötvös, and the other Hungarian ministers.*)

Extracts from a Debate in a crowded meeting of the Diet, July 20th, 1848, on the question whether Hungary should send troops to aid the Emperor of Austria in putting down the Italian insurgents in Lombardy.

“KOSSUTH, the Minister of Finance, resuming his address, [which he had suspended from exhaustion,] came now to speak of the Italian question. This is the first European question which the nation had had to consider since it attained its majority, [or its age of freedom.] They should not therefore allow themselves to be so far carried away by it as to forget their own country. He wished that this question should not agitate their minds, but that they should consider it calmly. When the fate of the nation is at stake, all sympathies and antipathies must be laid aside. Here the matter ought not to be viewed according to abstract principles; if it were, we should be obliged to bear their iron consequences; *if we protect the Italians because they are fighting for their freedom, then we must also concede the point to Croatia and Bohemia, and confess that they are in the right.* [Murmurs.] He openly confessed, he wished the Italian nation was free. At the former Diet, the question came up whether they were willing that the ministries of war and finance should be at Vienna. We answered, No. Thereupon, those persons [the Austrian ministers] said, ‘What shall we do? You will not assume any part of the state debt, and if the Italians break loose from us, we shall be driven to national bankruptcy; help us, at least, to end the war with honor.’ We plead impossibility as an excuse. The ministry is constituted, and then the insurrection breaks out on all sides. Then they said at Vienna, ‘Hungary will not help us, but Jellachich will; then we will make terms with Jellachich.’ This lies like a curse upon the Hungarian ministry. At Vienna, they appeal to the Pragmatic Sanction to show that we ought to help them to obtain an honorable peace. Now before the opening of the national assembly, where we claim that every member of the Dynasty should labor to support our integrity as a state, the Hungarian ministry must be very circumspect. Idle fancies are here of no use. France would help the Italian republic, but not the Italy of Charles Albert, who has just as much right to Lombardy, as Jellachich has to Croatia, or the Russian Czar to Hungary. I will explain fully the policy of the ministry. (He reads the protocol of the ministers’ plan, in which it was resolved, that if peace and order were restored to Hungary, they would then send the troops they did not need at home to effect an honorable peace.) Herein, continued the orator, we only say, ‘procure for us quiet in Hungary, and we will help you to gain an honorable peace.’ But to the Italians we

will say, 'strain not the cords too tight, or it may happen that we shall come to the help of Austria.' They have desired us to call back our troops from Italy. This is easily said, but not so easily done. We have from 10 to 12,000 men in Italy; but there are also 35,000 Croats there, who would also come back, and *we have no particular need of them*. He had here spoken only of the past policy of the ministry. He said nothing of the future. He did not say that they would immediately send an auxiliary army to Italy, or even how many they would send, but the moral power of such a declaration was very great, and by that alone, they might be a great help to Austria. (Unanimous applause.)

"IRINYI * opposed the proposition of the Minister of Finance. He said, it is proposed to aid in obtaining an honorable peace. But how if the Italians do not wish for such a peace? Then we must proceed to force. The wars of Austria are not the wars of Hungary. And then, what is the object of sending troops thither? That we may have a clear case against Croatia? But that is our affair, not Austria's. He would not make a bargain with the devil in order to get to heaven. (Laughter.) We will manage Croatia without the help of Austria.

"THE MINISTER EÖTVÖS did not agree with Irinyi. The Pragmatic Sanction binds us to help Austria, not when Austria is the aggressor, but when it is attacked; and this is now the case. He often heard people speak of the freedom of Italy; he loved freedom, and he loved Italy, besides being grateful to her as the cradle of civilization. But was Italy fighting for freedom? No; but for Charles Albert. We must judge this prince, not by his fine words, but by his acts. Besides, we shall send only as many troops there, as we can safely spare at home. We must in this matter support Austria. This is our true policy." *Die letzten zwei Jahre Ungarns*. Fünfte Lieferung, pp. 49 - 51.

Extracts from a Letter from Archbishop Raiachich to Field-Marshal Hrabowsky, dated "Carlowitz, August 1st, 1848."

"With a bleeding heart I take the pen to describe to your Excellency the horrors that have been committed by the Magyar troops at different places on the theatre of the civil war. There was not a single enemy in the Servian town of Futtak, when the Magyar troops under your Excellency's command fell upon the place, slaughtered innocent children, women, and old men, while others shamefully beat a priest, stripped him to the skin, and so dragged him naked round the place, while they plundered some

* This speaker is the person who, in open Diet, called the brutal murder of Count Lamberg by the Magyar mob "only a mistake in form."

of the houses, and burned others. In Mohol, they ripped open the belly of a venerable priest, and also beat his son to death.

"The abominations are indescribable which these savage soldiers committed in the churches at Futtak, Foldvar, Mohol, and Kikinda. I will pass over in silence the destruction in these churches of the seats, doors, prayer-books, chandeliers, and other articles of furniture devoted to God's service; but it is a thing unheard of in all history, that Christian troops, in an open place possessed by them, should seize on the Sacrament of the Eucharist standing in readiness for the dying on the holy altar, should throw it down, and trample it under foot, should kindle a fire on the holy altar, and commit other abominations on it not fit to be named; should fire their pistols at the image of the Holy Virgin, and stab out the eyes of the other images of the saints. As they could not cool their courage on the armed Servians, they violated women and maidens, hewed down children and other defenceless persons, cut off their ears and noses, plundered every thing they could carry away, and destroyed the rest.

"From this picture, falling far short of the reality, of the horrors thus far committed by the Magyar troops, your Excellency can easily infer, that this national war [or war of races] provoked by the Magyars, is already not far from turning into a religious war, and must issue in such a war, if some limits are not put to these barbarities. I greatly fear that very soon I shall no longer be able to hold back our own officers and troops from similar deeds of horror; I greatly fear that Bacska, the Banat, and Symmia will soon be made a wilderness. After what has now happened, I believe that the Servian people find themselves reduced to extremity, and as I know them, they will fight with the energy of despair for their nationality and their religion, and will rather die than allow themselves to be robbed of them. I must frankly confess to your Excellency, that from the barbarities already committed by the Magyars, the Servian nation already draws the inference that the Magyars are waging against them a war of extermination. What will be the issue? I believe it will be nothing else but this, — that they will adopt these practices of the Magyars, and will repay them like for like.

"The Servian nation has not the means for carrying on war which are at the disposal of the Magyar ministry; * they would never have thought of war, if they had not been urged and driven to it by the attack made on the 12th of June upon poor innocent Carlowitz, upon their sanctuary. They were firmly determined to recover their undoubted rights by legal means. Therefore

* The Servian population of Hungary number less than three quarters of a million; the Magyars are over four millions.

they sent me with a respectable deputation to the foot of the imperial throne, in order that they might find help there where they were always accustomed to find it when in distress.

I remain, with all respect,
Your Excellency's obedient servant,
JOSEPH RAJACHICH, Archbishop.

Extracts from the Official List of 467 persons executed by the Magyar revolutionary government.

"Camp at Szeczo, April 6, 1849.

"John Mericzey, priest, has been convicted of having, yesterday and the day before, entertained all the Austrian generals at his house, of having provided the hostile troops with all necessities of life, of having published and distributed the enemy's proclamations, of having preached, in his church, that the cause of Hungary was lost, and that Kossuth would soon die in the pillory, and, consequently, of having demoralized his parish, and acted as a traitor to the country. To prevent his doing further mischief, I had him shot, this morning at 5 o'clock.

"DAMJANICH, General." *

"Count Eugen Zichy, governor of the county of Weissenburg, was arrested on the 30th of September, 1848, and taken to the camp of the insurgents at Lore. He was tried by court-

* "Damianich, a Serb by birth, of strong build and gigantic stature, like Kinisy, 'the miller's lad,' fought against his countrymen with a deep and *conscientious* hate; one of his proclamations concluded with the following words: — 'I come to exterminate you, root and branch; and then I will send a ball through my own head, that the last Serb may vanish from the face of the earth.' There is a terrific grandeur in these words." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. ii. p. 110.

It is some consolation to know that this ruffian was one of the insurgent generals hanged at Arad, after the surrender of Georgey. Schlesinger thus describes his appearance at the place of execution. The usual color of his large features was heightened by rage and impatience. His view had never extended further than the glittering point of his heavy sabre. This was the star which he had followed throughout life; but now he saw whither it had conducted him; and impatiently he exclaimed, when limping up to the gallows, 'Why is it that I, who have always been foremost to face the enemy's fire, must here be the last?' Vol. ii. p. 233.

But let us hear the bold statement made by the *Christian Examiner*, (p. 466,) to prove that the other races were not deemed inferior and degraded and unworthy of holding office. "The first officer commissioned by the Hungarian ministry at the commencement of the insurrectionary movement in Croatia and Slavonia, was the Slavonian Hrabowsky, [who is nearly allied to Count Zichy, one of the most influential Magyar nobles in Hungary]; in the first battle which was fought in the late war, the Hungarians were commanded by the Wallachian Moga, [whom Kossuth deposed immediately after that *first* battle, and put Georgey, a Magyar noble, in his place]; *one of the most distinguished of their generals was the Serbian, Damjanich*; and the first act of the independent nation was to confer the highest office in the state upon the Slovak, Kossuth," [who was a Slovak in just the same way in which Damjanich was a Serbian; that is, they were both *nobiles Magyarisati*, and, as is usual with renegades, were more fanatically Magyar than the Magyars themselves.] Neither Hrabowski nor Moga had any connection with the Magyar revolutionists after October, 1848, the month in which war was first openly waged by the Magyars against Austria.

martial, under the presidency of Major Arthur Görgey, and hanged in the course of that very night." *

"Anton Hernogger, curate at Koka, in the county of Pesth, was arrested on the 6th of April, 1849, on the entrance of the rebel army into that county. He was taken to the camp at Isaszegh, and shot on the following morning. The cause of this severe proceeding has not transpired."

"John Duncsat, 47 years of age, married, district justice at Donau Pentele, in the county of Tolna. When the rebels entered that place, in April, 1849, he was accused of having held office under the Austrian government. He was arrested and tried by the court-martial at Szegedin. Although nothing could be laid to his charge, except his having held office under, and according to the orders of, the Austrian government, he was, on the 23d of April, ordered to be shot; and this sentence was executed three hours after it had been pronounced. He walked to the place of execution with a proud and haughty air, talking Latin to the priest who accompanied him. He undressed quietly, and, kneeling down, he was hit by three bullets, which brought him to the ground, but did not kill him. Another discharge of two muskets ended his sufferings.

"Adam Benkovics, 29 years of age, a native of Neuzina, in the county of Toronta, and John Perisits, 26 years of age, a native of St. Miklos, in the same county. They were accused of having, in the commencement of 1849, accepted office under the Austrian government, the former as district judge and the latter as juror and clerk; of having acted for and in behalf of the said government; of having proclaimed the constitution of the 4th of March; and of having enforced a conscription for the Emperor's army. Notwithstanding their appeal to the amnesty, granted by the rebel general Vecsey, they were shot on the 8th of May.

"John Anagnoszczzy, an inhabitant of Semlin, 41 years of age, who acted as a courier to the Austrian army, was stopped by the Hungarians in the county of Toronta, and, in spite of his desperate resistance, he was ultimately cut down and captured.

* On the morning of the 2d of October, the following announcement was placarded at every corner of the city [Pesth];—'Thus shall it be done to all traitors! Count Eugenius Zichy, formerly Lord Lieutenant of the Fejér county, convicted of having plotted with the enemies of the country, has been hung by sentence of Court-Martial, on the isle of Csepel, on the 30th of September, at nine o'clock, A. M.' Georgey presided over the court-martial which doomed the Count to the gallows." Pulszky's *Memoir of Georgey*. The brother of the murdered man, in a letter written from Florence, which was published in the English newspapers, accused Georgey and Kossuth of having robbed the house of their victim after his execution, and carried off from it some diamonds, emeralds, and other articles of costly jewelry, of which a Magyar magnate, with his half barbaric taste, always has a large store. The accusation was, that the Magyar leaders devoted these valuables to their own uses, and did not put them into the treasury of their party.

He was taken to the hospital at Szegedin ; and, having been cured of his wounds, he was tried by court-martial. In spite of his pleading his duty as a soldier, and in spite of his prayers for his life, he was condemned on the 8th of May, and executed on the same day. Before his condemnation, and even on the place of execution, he implored all the bystanders to save his life, crying, 'Noble Magyars, pardon me !' 'Dear Magyars, pardon me !' But it was all in vain."

"Joseph Papi, a magistrate of Weissenburg, was shot at Veszprim, on the 20th of August, 1849, for having in his possession certain papers relating to negotiations and to a surrender to the imperial troops.

"Anna Valentak, 70 years of age, was shot on the same day, by order of the rebel Mednyansky, for having written a letter to her uncle, assuring him that the Austrian troops would soon reconquer the country."

"The political suicide of Transylvania was not the will of a majority of the population, but was the work of terrorism. The civil war in Hungary and Transylvania broke out between the Magyars and the other races inhabiting those countries, — Croats, Slavonians, and Servians in the former, Saxons [Germans] and Wallachians in the latter, — *against the will of the king*, for the protection of their nationality endangered by the Magyars. The apostolic king and Austrian emperor then *for the first time* took part in it, when the Magyars threw down to him the glove of defiance. . . . The war in Hungary and Transylvania was not merely a struggle for the interests of a dynasty or a race, but for order against anarchy, for civilization against barbarism, for the support of society against its destruction. *Genesis der Revolution*, p. 383.

"I have already said that the Szeklers were found by the Magyars in the country [Transylvania] which they now occupy on their first entrance, and, on account of similarity of language and origin, were granted favors refused to the original inhabitants of the country. They were allowed the full enjoyment of their freedom on condition of defending the eastern frontier. . . .

"The richer and more powerful have gradually introduced on their own estates the system in operation in the rest of Transylvania, and the peasant and the seigneur are now found in the Szekler-land as elsewhere. Titles too, and letters of nobility, have been freely scattered through the country, and have gradually cast a slur on those who possess them not." Paget's *Hungary*, Vol. ii. pp. 390, 391.

"One of the fundamental laws of the Saxons [Germans] is

the equality of every individual of the Saxon nation. They have no nobles, no peasants. Not but that many of the Saxons have received letters of nobility, and deck themselves out in all its plumes; yet, as every true Saxon will tell you, that is only as Hungarian nobles, not as Saxons. Their municipal government was entirely in their own hands; every village chose its own officers, and managed its own affairs, without the interference of any higher power." *Ib.* pp. 431, 432.

"The greater part of the population of Transylvania consists of Wallachians, who are not represented in the Diet; and to these may be added the Gypsies, who lead a nomadic life, and dwell for the most part in tents. The language used in the transactions of the Diet is the Magyar. The number of deputies in the Transylvanian Diet of 1841-42 was 310, who were thus divided in regard to race: —

<i>Diet.</i>	<i>Population of Transylvania.*</i>
161 Magyars.	Magyars, 260,170
114 Szeklers.	Szeklers, 260,000
35 Saxons, (Germans.)	Saxon Germans, 250,000
—	Wallachians, 1,287,340
310	Others, 60,400

Hauer: *Ueber Oesterreichs Staatsausgaben*, p. 133.

"It was thus that the union of Transylvania with Hungary was decreed without asking the consent of the Roumani, who form a great majority of the population of the former province; it was thus that ultra-Magyar commissioners were sent to different localities with orders to exterminate the men of capacity and education, (meaning thereby the schoolmasters and the priests, without whose direction the rude Wallachian peasants could do no harm); it was thus that in the neighborhood of the cities and villages, and even on the highways, gibbets were erected, and on the public edifices in every part of Transylvania these words were inscribed, in the Hungarian and Roumanic language, *union or death*. The Roumani, driven to extremities, assembled, in the month of May, 1848, at Balasfalva, to the number of sixty thousand, presided over by their bishops of the Greek church.

"Never was there a more furious war than that which ensued as soon as the Roumani took up arms. The whole nation rose, men, women, and children. The levy *en masse* was organized under the national chieftains by all the promoters of this formal insurrection, who assumed the old Latin titles of *Prefects*, *Centurions*, and *Decurions*." Bourgoing: *Guerres d'Idiome*.

"The presence of the imperial armies, their manifestoes and

* According to Haeuffer, as cited by Bourgoing.

promises, and on the other side the straitened position of the Polish general, [Bem,] had the effect of arousing old hostilities, old recollections, claims, and hopes among the wild Wallachs, who in that country are called Motzen. The hordes of these mountaineers were stirred, and thousands crept from their hiding-places like reptiles awakened to new life by the sun's rays. Bem saw the numbers of his enemies increase fearfully on every spot of ground he had to defend." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. ii. p. 163.

"In Transylvania, the Wallachian peasantry rose against the Magyar proprietors. It was not merely a Jacquerie, as in Galicia—a war of class against class; but also a war of race against race, and the excesses of both parties were terrible. Again, in the Banat, the granary of Hungary, the Serbs made war against the Magyars and Germans indiscriminately, whether they were the friends of the King or of the Magyar government, of order or of the revolution, and entire villages have disappeared before their ravages." *Corvinus*, pp. 90, 91.

"The Committee of Defence had no sooner abandoned Pesth than it became evident that there was dissension in the Hungarian councils. General Görgey seems to have been the exponent of the ultra-independent feeling of the Magyar squirearchy, and he proclaimed at once, on his arrival at Waitzen, that he was in arms for the laws of April, 1848, and the lawful king Ferdinand V., and that the army would defend the country independently of all other authority." *Ib.* p. 81.

"It is not quite clear why Batthyányi, who was aware of Count Lamberg's mission, withdrew from Pesth on the 27th September, and so gave the Diet an opportunity to declare his mission illegal because his appointment was not properly countersigned. That declaration most assuredly paved the way to the murder of the King's Commissioner on the 28th; and it is impossible to assent to the Hungarian manifesto, where it states that 'Count Lamberg's death should be considered as a fact in itself.' The Diet must accept the responsibility of initiating the outrage; and it certainly failed to seize the occasion to repudiate the sanguinary sentiment of M. Irényi, when he described it in the Lower House as 'a mere mistake of form.'

"Upon the murder of Count Lamberg, Batthyányi, Eötvös, and even the Baron Wesselényi, the O'Connell of Transylvania, as he has been termed, left the country." *Corvinus*, p. 76.

"Nothing, indeed, shows more clearly the distinct character of the later period of the Hungarian revolution than the fate of this ministry. Prince Paul Esterházy tendered his resignation in September, 1848. Count Széchényi became insane on seeing

the misfortunes inevitably impending over his country, which he was powerless to avert. Baron Eötvös was obliged for his personal safety to fly from Hungary after the events which ended with the massacre of Count Lamberg ; whilst Deák and Klauzál retired into private life, when they became satisfied that M. Kossuth intended to continue the civil war at all hazards, by withdrawing with a section of the Diet to Debreczin." *Ib.* p. 68.

"When the Ban crossed the Drave in September, 1848, on his march towards Pesth, several officers of an Hungarian army-corps, which had been despatched to oppose his progress, came to his quarters and begged him to declare whether he had any orders from the King, as in case that he could satisfy them that he had such authority, although only given to him by word of mouth, they were prepared not to oppose him. The Ban's reply was, 'that he had no orders from the Emperor — that he was acting without any authority from him, and on his own responsibility — but that he believed that he was acting for the true interests of his country and his sovereign, and in conformity to the feelings of the army to which he gloried to belong.' " *Corvinus*, p. 72.

"The French statesmen, under pretext of a dread of Socialism, considered France not in a position to intervene. This party, under Lamartine, had already exerted their influence against Hungary, and the consequence was, that Pascal Duprat, who had in fact received his instructions from Bastide as agent in that country, did not leave France.

"In June 1849, the affairs of Hungary took a better turn in the Elysée and the hôtels of the ministers ; but the overthrow of the party of the Mountain again destroyed all that the emphatic manifestations of public opinion had effected in favor of Hungary. The very circumstance that the Socialists had taken part for Hungary was sufficient to determine the Conservatives against it." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. ii. p. 59.

"The greatest riddle of the Hungarian revolution is unquestionably the national Declaration of Independence, prompted by Kossuth, and proclaimed by the National Assembly at Debreczin, on the 14th of April, 1849, — an act which has been interpreted in various ways, for the most part incorrectly, and the real meaning of which is almost universally misunderstood." *Ib.* p. 75.

"Kossuth had suffered himself to be allured by phantoms into taking a premature step, — one of sad and important significance for the future." *Ib.* p. 81.

"The semi-republican declaration on the Theiss alarmed the French statesmen on the Seine, and the Tories in England had

on their side an easy game to play with Palmerston. Teleki in Paris and Pulszky in London endeavored to correct this evil, by declaring that they both adhered solely to the act of Independence ; but in so doing they found themselves in the no less fatal position, of being obliged to disavow the policy of their own government. These envoys, as the English and French journals of that time clearly show, endeavored to represent that the form of government for Hungary was to be considered an open question, and that this country could meanwhile be as little designated a republic as a monarchy." *Ib.* pp. 87, 88.

"A far greater error, which must be laid to the charge of the governor and his ministers, was the misapprehension of their task in reference to the question of nationalities. *The Declaration of Independence had no meaning, unless the perfect satisfaction of all the wishes of the Croats, Serbs, and Wallachs followed immediately.* The separation of Hungary from Austria ought at the same time to be a bond of union with the South-Slavish races. That this was not easy of accomplishment, must be admitted ; indeed it was extremely difficult to enter into any kind of peaceable and conciliatory relations with those nations."

"The government ought to have disarmed the power of the leaders, by issuing a proclamation, and at once conceding all the demands of the Hungarian Slaves, however exaggerated. No attempt ought to have been made to negotiate with the leaders, but the Diet should have addressed themselves directly with this explanation to the people. By such a step the Declaration of Independence would have gained in significance and grandeur."

"For we must not deceive ourselves : the question of Hungarian nationalities is such a tangled one, that other countries can scarcely be brought to conceive how Austria had succeeded in gaining the Slaves on her side."

"The Act of Independence might have been the cradle of Hungary's freedom : it was wrecked, on the false policy of the ministry, on the overthrow of Kossuth, and on Görgey's treachery." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. ii. pp. 88 - 90.

"A newspaper correspondent was right, who, in September 1848, addressed these words to the Hungarian ministry. 'Men of the government, explain to us why the anxious exclamation is so often uttered, that the country is in danger. The map lies before us, and the eye passes over a surface of 5,000 [German ?] square miles. How can a country of this extent have its security menaced by that narrow little strip of land to the south, which is called the kingdom of Croatia ? Above all, we conjure you, determine in clear and definite language what it is which you

call 'our country.' Tell us what we ought to think of when the land of Hungary is spoken about. What are we to understand by this name? Is it a land in which the domination of the Magyar race is to be supported, or is it a land in which Magyars, Slavonians, and Germans may live together free and happy, with an equal right to national existence? Upon the answer to this question depends the preservation or the ruin of free and independent Hungary. If territorial Hungary is meant, then we all come together there as one man; but if it is only the Magyar idea of 'our country,' — that is, if Hungary means stiff-necked Magyardom, then, among the Slavonians and the Germans, there is not one outstretched weaponed arm for such a meagre, despotic idea, but only tears for such a monstrous deception. Therefore make haste, gentlemen, to fix clearly the idea which the inhabitants of this beautiful land are to connect with the word *Hungary*. There is yet time, deliverance is yet possible, the fusion of the Magyars, the Slavonians, and the Germans into the unity of one Hungarian nation, is yet possible — yet only under the condition that you tell the people, what is their fatherland." *Thronfalge in Ungarn*, pp. 10, 11.

"The Slavonians are born democrats, and are especially democratic when the genius of their race is allowed to develop itself without hinderance. The Hungarian Slavonians wished for all those civic and political liberties which the Hungarians demanded; but they made the question of freedom second to that of nationality, and were willing to remain immovable on the ground of reform. And it was precisely this feeling of nationality which the Magyars strongly assailed, as if it were a thought of rebellion. The Magyars found it very natural to vindicate their own individuality as a nation and a race; but it excited great astonishment and indignation in them, that the Illyrians, [Croatians,] the Czechs, [Slovacks,] and the Wallachians, who are included within the limits of Hungary, should cherish the same wish. The Hungarians wished to Magyarize the Slavonians; but these were not inclined to submit to such a demand. The Magyars had dreamed of political unity for their own advantage; and they saw federalism appear, which they had themselves called into being. The moment the question of races was brought upon the carpet, political unity became impossible; and so Hungary entered upon a series of political movements which led to dissolution. Now the several races are engaged in furious war with each other. . . . Hence it happens, that, on the very day of the revolution, when Metternich and the old system were prostrated, the Magyars found themselves threatened on all sides, and by all those races whose national feelings in former times

they had not respected ; hence the protestations of the Slavonic congress at Prague, and the insurrections of the Slovacks in the Carpathian mountains ; hence the summons for the *Roumani* to come together and form one nation, which the republicans of Bucharest sent to the Wallachians of Transylvania ; hence, finally, the warlike attitude of the Croats." *Thronfalge, &c.*, pp. 16, 17.

"However much the free citizen of Austria must condemn the course which Jellachich pursued, he cannot withhold from him the acknowledgment that he was actuated on this occasion [the capture of Vienna,] by motives of humanity, when such motives were regarded as fantastical, and feeling was looked upon as eccentricity." Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. i. p. 71.

"Jellachich's first appearance was such as to command respect. In Croatia there was no pillage, but there was equipment ; there was no murdering — there was arming. The Ban roused his fellow-countrymen to the war against the Hungarians, with the same irresistible eloquence as that which subsequently enabled Kossuth to perform such incredible exploits ; he took the field for the independence of his nation with great talents for agitation and inflammatory enthusiasm. He entered the arena of the revolution with raised visor, in a spirit of self-reliance, of confidence in the power of his race, and — their right to revolt.

"The question naturally arose, why the Croats should not enjoy privileges which the Hungarians had obtained without a struggle, and which the Italians on the field of battle, and the Germans in their Parliament were striving to acquire ? No one who does not condemn all revolutions as indefensible, can consider the Croat insurrection less justifiable than those in Italy and Poland. In fact, at its commencement, Jellachich met with considerable sympathy both in and out of Austria, notwithstanding that Slavism had never enjoyed any great favor in Europe." *Id.* pp. 26, 27.

"The parliament held secret conferences, to discuss the great question how the hostile Slavish and Wallachian races might be won over to the Magyar cause. The result was, the transference of the command-in-chief to Görgey, (with the proviso that he should render at a future time an account of his conduct,) a declaration of the equal rights of all nationalities, and an amnesty to all who had borne arms against Hungary. [28th July, 1849.] These resolutions were adapted neither to times nor circumstances. Kossuth was still silent respecting Görgey, when he ought either to have spoken out or resigned. For the government to offer an amnesty at the moment when the war had taken a new and decisive turn, was tantamount to an admission of their

own weakness,—at the same time that it was evidently too early to do this, so long as those to whom the amnesty was offered had a well-founded hope of being soon in a position to grant an amnesty themselves. But the recognition of equal rights came a year too late, for it now merely offered to the Slavish races a concession which had already been secured to them by the Emperor of Austria, and offered it, moreover, in the sight of their burnt-down cities, desolated villages, and desecrated graves. The Magyar haughtiness, and the thirst for supremacy in the Hungarian nobility, never suffered a deeper humiliation than from the resolutions passed at this sitting of the Diet; it was the last—the last great expiatory sin-offering of the representatives of the Hungarian Nation for long years of injustice to the other races. Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*, vol. ii. pp. 188, 189.

“M. Kossuth and his ministers received with politeness, but with reserve, the overtures of the Poles and the Wallachians. On the 10th of June, [1849, two months before the end of the war] Casimir Bathiany, the minister of foreign affairs, writing to the political agents and to the commandants of the frontiers, addressed instructions to them which seemed to put off indefinitely the epoch of a compromise. ‘There are,’ he said, ‘three principles which must serve as a basis to this reconciliation, and in regard to which we shall concede nothing on any condition whatsoever; for it would amount to committing suicide with our own hands. These are,—1. the unity of the state; 2. the integrity of the territory of the state, as it has existed for centuries; 3. the supremacy of the Magyar element, acquired 1,000 years ago by the armed hand, the foundation of our autonomy, and consecrated by the use of the Magyar as the diplomatic language.’ Thus having taken the right of conquest as his banner, the minister speaks of the privileges of the Magyar language. ‘They have been,’ he continued, ‘defined by the laws. Thus, the deliberations of the legislative body, the laws, the documents which relate to them, are drawn up in the Magyar language. The Magyar is also the language of the government, of the inferior and higher tribunals of justice, of the superior schools, and of the registers of births and deaths.’ Can we consider M. Bathiany as serious in what he regards as a concession?”

“After the first defeats of Georgey and Bem, when the image of death under its most terrific aspect was presented from all quarters to the insurrectionary government, Kossuth, with the ministry and the legislative assembly, began to show himself less hostile to projects of compromise. Under the fear which then seized upon all minds, they agreed to make some of the concessions which the agents of the Wallachians demanded. It was at

Szegedin, the last asylum of the fugitive government, on the 14th of July, one month before the end of the war, that the minister acquainted the Wallachians with this tardy resolution. As to the demands of the Poles in favor of the Slavonians, the Magyars still hesitated; only at the last moment, and when on the point of expiring at Arad, did they resign themselves to this last and grievous sacrifice. Hardly had the Wallachians had time to become acquainted with the new rights which were conceded to them with so bad grace, when already the ruin of Hungary was consummated. The Servians and the Croats heard of the very small concessions made to them only after the catastrophe, with the news of the capitulation at Villagos." H. Desprez: *Revue des deux Mondes*, January 15, 1850.

"The moral development of nations is incessantly advancing, and the history of the last year must have given a mighty impulse to the intelligence of the various nationalities of Austria. No nation is altogether good, but none is wholly bad. The Wallach and the Serb are not inferior in point of valor to the Magyar and the Pole; the German is their master in civilization; the Czech and the Slovak surpass them in many valuable, peaceful virtues. The bond of union amongst these races will eventually be the recognition of their common enemy; and if the death-knell of Hungary has the power of awakening this recognition, if over the grave of Hungary the hostile races relinquish their jealousies, and mutually extend the hand of reconciliation and union, then Hungary will not have bled in vain; she will have achieved in her defeat greater benefits for mankind at large, than she would ever have been able to accomplish by her triumph." * Conclusion of Schlesinger's *War in Hungary*.

Our string of citations is a long one, so long that there is but little space left for comment; and, fortunately, but very little comment is needed. It is seldom necessary, upon any subject, to produce so formidable an array of authorities. But questions of fact, when by any means the prejudices of the community have been excited in relation to them, can be settled only by abundance of testimony; and we have therefore summoned into court a crowd of witnesses, English, French, German, and Hungarian, professing all forms of political doc-

* To prevent all cavilling, it may be as well to state, once for all, that these citations have been made for the statements of *facts* which they contain, and not for the expression of *opinions*, which, in a few instances, we do not share. Also, to save space, we have been obliged to make the extracts as brief as possible; but the omissions are indicated, and the exact references to the volumes and pages will enable any reader to verify them with little difficulty.

trine, from the frigid zone of despotism to the tropical regions of red-republicanism, whose united and harmonious testimony can leave no doubt upon a mind of ordinary capacity, however unwelcome the truth may be, or how obstinate soever the bias by which its reception at an earlier day was prevented. Just a year ago, we attempted to give in our own words, with a mere reference to such authorities as might be supposed to be accessible to many, a general account of the causes and nature of the civil war which had then just ceased to rage in Hungary. This plain and inoffensive statement of historical facts concerning a nation upon the eastern confines of Europe, with whom our countrymen had had no political, commercial, or literary relations whatever, and of whose history they might fairly be presumed to know as little as they did of the early annals of China, was received in a manner which shows how dangerous it may sometimes be to speak the truth, even in a land where freedom of thought and the liberty of the press are professedly guarded with the most jealous care. It is unnecessary here to dwell particularly upon the repeated and outrageous attempts that were made, through the least respectable portion of the newspaper press, to direct a storm of public indignation against the writer of the article on Hungary, and against the Journal in which it appeared. Endeavors to establish a system of terrorism, in order to repress the free expression of opinion upon matters not at all connected with our domestic politics, are fortunately so rare in America, that they are sure, in the long run, to meet the indignant reprobation of the community. When they are confined to the usual forms of newspaper abuse and anonymous threatening letters, they can be treated with contemptuous disregard; when they menace the character, the profession, the livelihood, and even the personal safety of a writer, the authors of them display rather their malevolent intentions than their power to injure. A cause which can be supported only by such means, to which it is humiliating to be compelled to allude, is not likely to prosper.

We have now told the story of the civil war in Hungary over again, merely using the language of a crowd of reputable and unimpeached witnesses, instead of our own; and it may safely be left to the judgment of the reader, to decide which form of the statement is more favorable to the Magyars.

With a natural feeling of respect for their gallantry in battle, and for some chivalrous points in their character and demeanor, we suppressed, or passed lightly over, many pages in the record of the shocking barbarities which they committed, and of the insulting and oppressive treatment, continued for centuries, which at length goaded their long-suffering, subject races into rebellion. Since the fall of the aristocracies of Venice and Poland, the Magyars in Hungary, with few exceptions, have been the most arrogant, cruel, and tyrannical nobility in Europe. The robber barons of the Middle Ages did not more fully merit the vengeance which sometimes overtook them at the hands of their despairing vassals, than did these semi-barbarous nobles the ruin which has at length befallen them. They have kept their country three centuries behind the age, for the sole purpose of retaining their odious privileges as an order and a race. The policy even of Austrian despotism was liberal and enlightened compared with theirs. They were the firmest supporters, the pliant instruments and vassals, of that despotism, so long as it would aid them in riveting the chains upon their unhappy subjects. When that aid was withdrawn, they turned fiercely against the power to which they had so long submitted without a murmur, and at the same moment found themselves surrounded, as with a wall of fire, by their revolted and desperate vassals. Slowacks and Wallachians, Servians, Germans, and Croats, races separated from each other by the widest differences of language, manners, and religion, were now united by a common hatred of the Magyars, and fought against them with a long restrained thirst for vengeance, and with all the energy of despair. The scenes of the war which ensued were sickening to humanity, and an opprobrium to the age. Fortunately, it was of short continuance; the Magyars were crushed in the unequal contest; and their fair land is now a scene of desolation and ruin.

"Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos."

This tyrannical aristocracy, after actively aiding Austria, so late as the summer of 1848, to trample out the last sparks of freedom in Italy, at length became dissatisfied because the emperor would not help them to suppress the rebellion of their own vassals, and made war against him, commencing hostilities by the shocking murders of Count Latour and

Count Lamberg. This war they prosecuted for six months, carefully leaving the door open for reconciliation, till the emperor published a liberal constitution, which abrogated all distinctions of race among his subjects, and established representative institutions and equal suffrage throughout the empire. Then, indeed, in their fear lest the liberal policy which Austria had been *compelled* to adopt should be fatal to their own arrogant pretensions and aristocratic privileges, they severed the last tie which bound them to the empire, and fought desperately for the independence and aggrandizement of Magyardom. This nearly accidental circumstance, that, at a comparatively late period in the history of the contest, Austria became a party to it and fought against the Magyars, was quite enough to direct the sympathies of all those who knew nothing about the affairs of Hungary. It was almost universally taken for granted, not merely that Austria was contending for despotism, — a supposition which is usually a very safe one, — but that her opponents, the Magyars, were fighting for freedom and the establishment of equal rights, an opinion which happened to be the direct opposite of the truth. The mere fact that the Magyars formed but one third of the population of Hungary, though they arrogated to themselves exclusively the appellation of Hungarians, and were waging war against the other two thirds, would have been enough, if generally known, to dispel the illusion as to the character of the war, had it not been for a farther circumstance, almost as casual as the one already mentioned. As their haughty and oppressive conduct had left the Magyars without a single ally among the races and nations by whom they were immediately surrounded, they saw fit, after the contest had been raging for some months, to adopt as friends and associates in the war, the savage red republicans and infidel socialists, who had been driven from the Parisian barricades in June, and who were now justly proscribed in almost every city and nation in Europe. It was a strange and unnatural alliance in every respect but one; the murderers of Count Lamberg and Count Zichy might well make common cause with the assassins of General Brea and the Archbishop of Paris.

This last circumstance explains how it is that the delusion, or deception, about the war in Hungary has been so pertinaciously kept up here in America. In several of our large

cities there is unfortunately a small *clique* of these infidel socialists, mostly refugees from Europe, who have obtained command of a few penny newspapers, and are endeavoring through their means to exercise the system of *terrorism* here which they practised on a large scale in the old world. Professing, sometimes with truth, to have been actors in the terrible scenes of which they speak, they systematically pervert the truth of history respecting them, in order to gain sympathy and charity for themselves; and to every attempt to represent these affairs in their true light, they oppose nothing but fierce denunciation and personal menace,—the only weapons that are left to them since the stiletto and the pistol have been wrested from their grasp.

How successful they have been, among those who ought to be better informed, in making converts to their daring falsities, appears in an article from a highly respectable source in the last number of the *Christian Examiner*, to which we are now, though with great reluctance, compelled to allude. The writer of it, but for defect of knowledge, would doubtless have censured, as strongly as we have done, the conduct and projects of the Magyars, and the infamous system of falsehood and terrorism through which their cause has been supported in other lands. The character of the whole article, which is nearly seventy pages long, may be inferred with sufficient accuracy from a single statement in it, which we copy as a curiosity, for it is certainly one of the most astounding assertions on record. The only facts alleged in immediate confirmation of it, are those which we have already considered in a footnote, on page 226.

“*Since the reign of St. Stephen, all the races inhabiting the kingdom have composed the Hungarian nation, and have shared equally in all its honors and all its sufferings.*” *Christian Examiner* for November 1850, p. 466.

We have no doubt, whatever, that the writer fully believed this marvellous statement at the time of making it. It only shows how far one may be misled by a little pardonable vanity, arising from the consciousness of having acquired some knowledge of the Magyar language,—a very rare, if not unique, accomplishment for one not born in Hungary,—and by implicit reliance on a single, but very untrustworthy, source of information.

It is quite unnecessary to waste much time upon the consideration of an article, which contains such an extraordinary assertion, and which also appears to have been written, not so much for the purpose of explaining the nature of the war in Hungary, as for that of damaging the reputation of the only American writer who has dared to plead the cause of ten millions of oppressed and down-trodden Slavonians, Wallachians, and Germans, who at last rose in rebellion against the arrogant and cruel Magyar aristocracy, "the only firm prop of the Austrian throne," — the aristocracy which had for centuries kept them in thrall. The cause must be a desperate one which needs to be supported by such historical statements as are made by this writer. It is difficult to consider them with gravity, and humiliating to be obliged to confute them by references to such authorities as are in the hands of everybody, — to pages with which a school-boy may be supposed to be familiar. If the Examiner will not admit the authority of such writers as Gibbon, Robertson, Coxe, Professor Smyth, and others, because they were ignorant of the Magyar language, (which is one of the reasons gravely assigned for declaring us incompetent to weigh historical testimony,) we have no further defence to offer. Not one of these writers knew a word of Magyar; we do not know a word of Magyar; and of the twenty millions of people, not Hungarian born, who inhabit this country, probably nineteen millions, nine hundred and ninety-nine thousand, nine hundred and ninety-nine are in the same predicament, the solitary exception being the writer in the Examiner. Not one of us knows whether *fonebbi* means *above* or *former*; and if this disqualifies us from saying any thing about the history of Hungary, we must all hold our tongues. And on the same principle, we must declare that no one shall write about the history of America, who has not a thorough knowledge of Choctaw.

But if the Examiner will abate a little of its lofty pretension, and admit ordinary mortals, like Robertson, Gibbon, and Coxe, to be good authorities for the history of Hungary, these imputed historical blunders can be easily shown to be well-known facts in history. Admitting that the "inaccuracies" in question "have not a direct relation to this subject," and being apparently conscious that a very bad motive might be

assigned as the only reason for noticing them at all, the writer apologizes with great gravity for devoting space to them, by saying that in referring to the *recent* history of Hungary, "we shall often be compelled to refer to authorities which may not be in the possession of our readers. We must, *therefore*, in order to prepare them to credit the existence of errors of such magnitude" in the Review, "point out mis-statements of the same nature in relation to portions of history with which they are conversant;" that is, if we understand the logic, if the North American Review is mistaken about the *ancient* history of Hungary, the Examiner must be correct in its statements about the *recent* history of that country, and must have made a faithful use of those authorities which are not generally accessible, — because, we suppose, they are in the Magyar tongue. But no matter about the logic. We accept the challenge, such as it was meant to be; if the Examiner be found to have told the truth about the *ancient* history of Hungary, which is generally well known, we will admit that it has some claim — though a very faint one — to be believed when it makes assertions about the *recent* history of that land, which, in this country, is very little known. Its charges of historical blunders are eight in number, and we will consider them *all*.

1. The Examiner sneers at us for representing Ferdinand I. as "claiming to be rightful sovereign [of Hungary], in quality, apparently, of descendant from his wife," after we had admitted that the Hungarian crown at this period was elective. Dr. Robertson says that he *did* claim the crown, and that "this claim was founded on a double title; the one derived from the ancient pretensions of the house of Austria to both kingdoms; *the other from the right of his wife, the only sister of the deceased monarch*;" and in the very next sentence, he admits that the crown was elective. Archdeacon Coxe asserts the same fact in almost exactly the same language. The Examiner's sneer, therefore, is directed against these two historians.

2. We had asserted that "*after* the memorable scene with Maria Theresa, this right [of the House of Hapsburg to reign in Hungary] was extended, according to the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction, to the female line." The Examiner objects that "if this right had not been extended to the

female line in the lifetime of *Charles the Third, father of Maria Theresa*, the memorable scene could never have taken place." The ignorance here displayed is almost incredible. Charles the Third lived seven or eight centuries before Maria Theresa was born. *Charles the Sixth*, (as he is called by all historians except the Magyars*) who was her father, had indeed persuaded the Hungarians nominally to accept the Pragmatic Sanction some twenty years before "the scene;" just as most of the sovereigns of Europe had done, who broke their pledge immediately after the death of Charles, just as the Hungarians were expected to break theirs. Of course, the female line was actually established on the throne only by the success of the queen's appeal to the feelings of the Hungarian Diet. Archdeacon Coxe, who is followed by Prof. Smyth, when speaking of the preparation for the scene in 1741, says, "the gray-haired politicians of the court of Vienna in vain urged that the Hungarians, who, *when Charles the Sixth proposed the Pragmatic Sanction, had declared that they were accustomed to be governed by men, and would not consent to a female succession*, would seize this opportunity of withdrawing from the Austrian domination. But Maria Theresa formed a different judgment, and her opinion was justified by the event."

3. The Examiner, in referring to a statement of ours, says that "the confirmation of the union with Austria, or *to speak more accurately*, the confirmation of the House of Hapsburg on the Hungarian throne by the act of the Diet of 1687," could not have contributed to the release of Hungary from the Turks in 1683. Of course, it could not; but according to Coxe and all other historians, (except the Magyars,) the union with Austria was in fact confirmed as early as 1567; and it was not till *long after* this event, that the Turks were driven out. In that year, John Sigismond, the last formidable claimant of the Hungarian throne against the House of Austria, according to Coxe, signed a treaty with Maximilian II.,

* The overweening national pride of the Magyars appears even ludicrous, when manifested through their obstinate determination not to recognize their sovereigns except under the appellation by which they were known in the annals of Hungary, though they were universally known by a different title throughout civilized Europe. Grave complaints were made by Magyar writers, and even by the Magyar Diet, because their late sovereign *would* style himself Ferdinand I., while they persisted in calling him Ferdinand V. What common reader would recognize the second James of England under his Scotch title of James VII.?

in which "he engaged not to assume the title of king of Hungary except in his correspondence with the Turks, and to acknowledge the emperor as king, his superior and master." Sigismund died four years afterwards, when "all his possessions in Hungary reverted to Maximilian." Hungary continued, indeed, to be *nominally* an elective kingdom till 1687; but the sovereigns of Austria were always chosen in lineal succession, so that the election was a mere form.

4. The Examiner goes on to affirm that "the Turks were *not* driven out of Hungary in 1683; *neither were they driven out by Sobieski*, though the Reviewer seems so well satisfied of this fact, &c." We had tolerably good reasons to be satisfied of it, if Coxe, and every other English, French, and German historian who have written the history of this period, are to be trusted. We refer to Coxe chiefly, because his volumes can be obtained by every one, and because his diligence, fidelity, and impartiality have never been questioned. Prof. Smyth relies upon him almost exclusively, and says "his work is executed with every appearance of diligence and precision." Now, Coxe says, that Sobieski raised the siege of Vienna, September 12th, 1683, put his army in motion again five days afterwards, overtook and defeated the Turks again at Parkan on the 27th of October, invested Gran, and compelled it to surrender. "This success was followed by the surrender of the towns which had submitted in the first panic of the invasion, and which again hastened to acknowledge their sovereign, *while the Turkish army, continuing their flight to Belgrade, abandoned Hungary.*" Sobieski then became dissatisfied with the emperor, and withdrew his troops into Poland.

5. We had said that "in the final struggle, the noted Tekeli and his partisans fought with the Turks against Sobieski;" for proof of which, see Coxe and all other historians, (except the Magyars,) *passim*. The Examiner *seems* to deny this, by asserting that "Sobieski was already dead at the time of the final struggle," which it fixes in 1716; while, on the authority given above, we placed it in 1683. The decisive blow given to the Turkish power, after which it never again became formidable to all Europe, though it often afterwards invaded Hungary at the request and by the assistance of the Magyar nobility, was when Sobieski defeated the

Ottoman army before Vienna, and drove it back to Belgrade. To prove that these are the familiar and notorious facts of history, we will quote even from so common a book as McCulloch's *Universal Gazetteer*, where it is said, (speaking of Turkey under Solyman the Magnificent,) "at this period, the Turkish empire was, unquestionably, the most powerful in the world. Nor had this mighty power even then reached its greatest height. Solyman was succeeded by other able princes; and the Ottoman arms continued to maintain their ascendancy over those of Christendom *until in 1683, the famous John Sobieski, king of Poland, totally defeated the army employed in the siege of Vienna. This event marked the era of their decline.*" Vol. ii. p. 977.*

6. Commenting on our assertion that the Turks held possession of nearly half of Hungary for a century and a half after Ferdinand came to the throne, the Examiner says, "this, then, was the protection which the Hungarians found *from their enemies* in the union with Austria;" and again, "Austria neither protected the Hungarians from the Turks, nor suffered them effectually to protect themselves." This is really too bad. During the whole period in question, the greater part of the Magyars were, not the enemies, but the active allies and friends, of the Turks against the Christian powers of Europe; their leaders, John of Zapolya and his posterity, and Tekeli and others, could not have kept up the contest with Austria for a month, except by the aid of the infidels.

7. The Examiner objects to our calling both John Hunniades and his son, the almost equally renowned Corvinus, *kings* of Hungary, by saying that the former was *not* a king, but only "governor of Hungary." He was a king in fact, though not in name, just as Charles Martel and Pepin were really kings of France, though nominally only mayors of the palace. Gibbon does not hesitate to speak of the *reign* of Hunniades in the same sentence in which he alludes to "the *titular* king, Ladislaus of Austria."

8. We once used the abbreviated expression "emperor of

* In a former publication of this paragraph in a newspaper, in place of the sentence here cited from McCulloch, another sentence, which was quite irrelevant, was accidentally substituted by a mistake of the copyist.

Austria," instead of the more common phrase "emperor of the House of Austria." Of course, the former expression is just as correct as the latter; for the sovereigns in question were emperors (of the Holy Roman Empire,) an appellation which had become merely titular for more than a century before Francis resigned it, so that they were usually designated by adding the name of their hereditary dominions. Many writers do not hesitate to use the shorter phrase frequently, as it could hardly mislead even a school-boy.

We have now considered *all* the specifications in the charge of blundering in our statements of historical facts, and can safely leave the reader to form his own opinion of them. Of course, it is unnecessary to dwell upon the assertions of *such* a writer in regard to the recent war in Hungary. According to the terms of the Examiner's own challenge, uttered in reference to the preceding allegations, all its subsequent statements, confessedly derived from authorities not generally accessible, are wholly undeserving of credit.

We have but a word to add about the alleged inconsistencies in our account of the conduct of the Hungarian nobles. We spoke of their conduct at two different periods, — the one extending from the earliest period of their history down, certainly, to as late an epoch as 1836; the other extending from 1836 to the eve of the recent revolution. We spoke of their conduct as a body during the first period with uniform and strong censure; upon the course pursued by a party among them during the later period, we bestowed the highest eulogy, comparing Széchény, their leader, even to our sainted Washington. The Examiner takes isolated sentences and paragraphs from the two distinct statements, which are carefully distinguished throughout in the article, places them side by side, and cries out that the Review confutes itself!

But the gravest misstatement in the Examiner is yet to be noticed. For the purpose of calling down popular odium upon the Review, the writer openly declares that our object in the article published a year ago was "to undertake the defence of Austria," and "to disenchant his readers from the spell" which had connected with the Metternich policy and the name of Austria "no associations but those of meanness, stagnation, moral death."

Now what are the facts? In our first article, the conduct and policy of the Austrian government were censured from beginning to end, in the strongest language that we could command. It was expressly stated, that no credit was due to it even for what *seemed* to be a liberal act, the grant of a new Constitution. The execution of the Magyar chiefs, after the insurrection was crushed, was declared to be cruel, wicked, and even impolitic. The motives of Austria were shown to be selfish, even in the protection which she had granted to the peasants and the subject races against the Magyars; as her only object was, to establish her own despotic power, by limiting the privileges and extinguishing the power of the nobility. Finally, in a second article upon the subject, published nine months ago, the opinion was expressed that "the conduct of Austria has been as selfish, her pretences as hollow, her concessions as unwillingly made, during the last two years, as in any former period of her history." It was further stated, that "we should have heartily rejoiced if the civil war in Hungary, or the Slavonic insurrection which preceded and caused that war, had caused the final dismemberment of her (the Austrian) ill-jointed empire, — which has had no principle of political cohesion, but forces together, by a sort of Mezentian union, races and countries that are implacably hostile, — together with the dethronement of that House of Hapsburg, whose very name is a byword in history for perfidy, cruelty, and oppression."

We leave the reader to characterize the statement made in the *Examiner* in any manner which he may think it deserves.

The Reviewer "throws slight and ridicule even on that celebrated example of self-devotion and loyalty, which drew forth the brilliant eulogium of Montesquieu, and waked a glow even in the cold heart of Voltaire. The pages of these popular writers have made this scene familiar and dear to the memories of thousands, and we believe that no part of the attack on the Hungarians called forth a more lively sense of the indignity offered to that brave people than the passage in which this scene was coupled with the sneering epithets 'theatrical and in bad taste.'" *Christian Examiner*, p. 134.

The language here is studiously ambiguous; but every reader would certainly draw from it the inference which it was plainly intended that he should draw, — namely, that we had designated the celebrated scene with Maria Theresa as

"theatrical and in bad taste" *on the part of the Hungarians*. It happens that we did no such thing. In illustrating some of those "characteristics of the Magyar race" which "interest the imagination and the feelings *strongly in their favor*," in dwelling upon "their *chivalrous*, haughty, and aristocratic spirit," their intense feeling of nationality, and their "enthusiasm of character, coupled with some picturesque peculiarities of dress and customs, [which] is *one great cause of the favor*" with which the Magyar cause was received in Europe, we alluded, among other things, to the memorable scene with Maria Theresa, and described the costume that she then wore, and the manner in which she was received.

"The whole scene would have appeared theatrical and in bad taste to *any other legislative body in Europe* ; but it was *perfectly in character for the Magyars*, who have shown the same spirit on more recent occasions." *N. A. Review* for January, 1850. pp. 103, 104.

The inference from such language is very clear. The scene was in character *for the Magyars* ; it suited their chivalrous spirit, their enthusiasm of character ; it interested the imagination and the feelings in their favor. But *in any other legislative body*, not possessing these traits of character, it would have been simply ludicrous. Imagine an imitation of "the scene" in the English parliament, at about the same period, when the rebellion of 1745 was in prospect. Suppose that, during the alarm which was then general, the grave legislators of England, in full warlike costume, had assembled in St. Stephen's chapel ; that their half-German sovereign, who was not very fluent in the English tongue, had made them a speech in a dead language ; and that the whole assembly, in great delight, had then jumped up, clashed their swords together, and exclaimed in very bad Latin, *Moriamur pro rege nostro, Georgio Secundo*. Would such a scene have drawn forth "the brilliant eulogium of Montesquieu, and waked a glow even in the cold heart of Voltaire ?"

"The Reviewer *makes no attempt to explain* how it was that the peasants of this haughty race, men in whom all the characteristics of the Magyar were much more strongly marked than in the nobles even of their own race, came to make common cause with their oppressors." *Christian Examiner*, p. 443.

This is not true ; and the writer, who appears to have examined our article with a microscope, dwelling upon the force of every sentence in it, could hardly have failed to know that it was not true. In the course of the two pages next subsequent to the passage on which the Examiner is here commenting, there are two distinct "attempts to explain" why the Magyar peasants made common cause with the Magyar nobles, which we will here copy, to allow the reader to form his own opinion of the weight due to them.

"The Magyars who are not noble form the higher class of the peasantry ; and though not often rich, they have generally most of the necessaries, and even the comforts of life, as the feudal burdens on their lands are not excessive, and their tenant rights are often very valuable. Whether peasants or nobles, they pride themselves on their race, and regard the Wallachians and Slavonians as their subjects, if not as inferior beings." *N. A. Review* for January, 1850, p. 88.

"The Magyar peasants, it is true, had nothing to do with the direction of affairs, though their interests, so far as they came in conflict with those of the Slavonian and Wallachian peasants, were, of course, protected by the great body of the Magyar nobility, who owned all the land and made all the laws." *Ib.* p. 89.

But it is a pitiable undertaking to follow the track of a writer who is thus reckless in assertion ; and we gladly stop here, though our materials are far from being exhausted.

ART. VIII. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Specimens of Newspaper Literature, with Personal Memoirs, Anecdotes, and Reminiscences.* By JOSEPH T. BUCKINGHAM. Boston : Little & Brown. 1850. 2 vols. 12mo.

It is often said, that we live under a government of newspapers. Perhaps no one can appreciate the full force of this remark, till he has reviewed the political history of the country, especially of New England, ever since the Declaration of Independence, with a special reference to the effects produced by the most influential of these organs and guides of public sentiment.